Annotated logics were introduced in 43] and later studied in 5, 7, 31, 32] . In 31], annotations were extended to allow variables and functions, and it was argued that such logics can be used to provide a formal semantics for rule-based expert systems with uncertainty. In this paper we continue to investigate the power of this approach. First, we introduce a new semantics for such programs based on ideals of lattices. Subsequently, some proposals for multivalued logic programming 5, 7, 32, 47, 40, 18] as well as some formalisms for temporal reasoning 1, 3, 42] are shown to t into this framework. As an interesting by-product of this investigation, we obtain a new result concerning multivalued logic programming: a model theory for Fitting's bilattice-based logic programming, which until now has not been characterized model-theoretically. This is accompanied by a corresponding proof theory.
Introduction
Large knowledge bases can be inconsistent in many ways. Nevertheless, certain \localizable" inconsistencies should not be allowed to signi cantly alter the intended meaning of such knowledge bases. As classical logic semantics decrees that inconsistent theories have no models (and hence are meaningless from a model-theoretic point of view), classical logic is not the appropriate formalism for reasoning about inconsistent knowledge bases.
As a step towards the solution of this problem, annotated logic programs were introduced by Subrahmanian in 43] and were subsequently studied in 5, 7] by Blair and Subrahmanian. In 32, 33], Kifer and Lozinskii extended the theory to a full-edged logic, and it was shown that a sound and complete proof procedure exists. More e cient proof procedures have been recently obtained, and implementations of these theorem provers have been designed (cf. 12, 26] ). Kifer and Li 31] extended annotated programs in a di erent direction by allowing variables and evaluable function terms to appear as annotations. We will call such programs generalized annotated programs (GAPs, for short). The utility of annotated logics for reasoning with A preliminary report on this research has appeared in 34] y Work supported in part by the NSF grant inconsistency and for programming expert systems was well argued in 5, 7, 31, 32, 33] . In this paper we continue to investigate the power of this formalism.
First we extend the semantics of 7, 31, 32, 33 ] to allow annotation variables over arbitrary semilattices of truth values (in 31] only a special lattice -the Cartesian product of two unit intervals -was considered and in 7, 32, 33] , the notion of annotation variable was not present).
Then we present the model-theoretic, xed-point, and operational semantics of GAPs. In Section 5.1 we show that van Emden's quantitative logic programming 47] is a special case of GAPs. Then, in Section 5.2, we show how Fitting's bilattice-based logic programming approach ts into the framework of GAPs. The consequence of this \ t" is that we can now characterize Fitting's approach model-theoretically (no model-theoretic semantics was previously proposed for this approach). By translating 47] and 18] into GAPs, we obtain a sound and complete proof procedure for these theories, thus strengthening van Emden's soundness and completeness theorems (which were obtained under some restrictions) and complementing Fitting's results. Lastly, we demonstrate how to incorporate two versions of temporal logic programming in the framework of GAPs { in the rst, we consider a discrete linear version of time, i.e., each instant of time is a time point; in the second, we consider an interval-based temporal logic. We show that GAPs are su ciently expressive to be able to cope with a large body of temporal problems and, in particular, subsume some of the earlier proposals for temporal logic programming 3]. Although our approach cannot directly represent certain constructs used in temporal speci cations, we note that the implication problem in most full-edged temporal logics is 1 1 -complete and therefore such logics cannot be adequately implemented on a computer, anyway. In contrast, the corresponding problem for temporal speci cations in GAPs is semi-decidable and thus they are more suitable for a computer implementation.
We believe that this paper uni es, and in some cases, generalizes various results and treatments of multivalued logic programming. Furthermore, it presents new applications of this formal setting. So far, research in multivalued logic programming has proceeded along three di erent directions:
1. Annotated logics as described in 5, 7, 32, 33]; 2. Bilattice-based logics 23, 17] ; and 3. Quantitative rule sets 47, 39, 29, 36, 41, 28, 40] .
Earlier studies of these three approaches quickly identi ed various distinctions between these frameworks. For example, one of the key insights behind bilattices was the interplay between the truth values assigned to sentences and the notion of implication in the language under consideration. Thus, rules (implications) had weights (or truth values) associated with them as a whole. The problem was to study how truth values should be propagated \across" implications. Annotated logics, on the other hand, appeared to associate truth values with each component of an implication rather than the implication as a whole. The implication itself was then interpreted in a \classical logic" fashion. The two approaches had their own advantages and disadvantages: although associating truth values with implications, as in 23], has intuitive appeal, annotated logics provide a simpler formalism that is much closer to classical logic. Besides, in 33] it is shown that for many problems in nonmonotonic reasoning, it is easier to arrive at the intended semantics via nonmonotonic annotated logics, compared to the bilattice-based formalism of 23].
However, one of the principal results of this paper is to show that this dichotomy can be done away with. The GAP framework introduced here uses the \classical" de nition of implication in the same way as in 43, 7, 32] . However, by appropriately generalizing the concept of an annotation, we are able to capture the propagation of truth values \across" implications (cf. Theorems 7 and 8) , at least to the extent this propagation is treated in 17] . This is one of the key insights provided by this paper.
Additionally, this paper demonstrates that the GAP framework can be used to implement a semi-decidable fragment of temporal logics, which is a new application for GAPs. Ginsberg 24] has recently observed that there are various connections between bilattices and modal logics, temporal logics in particular. However, his treatment of temporal logics is very sketchy and no semidecidable proof theory for a large enough fragment of such logics is given.
Generalized Annotated Logic Programs
We assume an upper semilattice T of truth values, and denote the semilattice ordering on T by and the least upper bound operator by t. The semilattice needs not be complete. It is often convenient to assume the existence of a greatest element in T , denoted >, and some of our results will depend on this assumption. The greatest lower bound operator, when it exists, is denoted by u. Elements of T can be thought of as con dence factors 7, 31] , or degrees of belief 7, 32, 33] , or, as we shall see later, as truth values similar to those used in multivalued logics. In addition, sometimes it will be assumed that T has a unique least element, denoted ?; in these cases this assumption will be made explicitly.
For each i 1, we postulate that there is a family F i of total continuous (hence monotonic) functions, each of type T i ! T , called annotation functions. We denote F = i 1 F i and assume that all functions f in F are computable in the sense that there is a uniform procedure P f such that if f is n-ary and 1 ; . . .; n are given as input to P f , then f( 1 ; . . .; n ) is output by P f in a nite amount of time. We also assume that each F j contains a j-ary function t j , derived from the semilattice operator t, which, given inputs 1 ; . . .; j , returns the least upper bound of f 1 ; . . .; j g. Slightly abusing the notation, we will often write t instead of t j . Apart from the interpreted annotation functions, the language contains usual uninterpreted functions, constants, and predicate symbols, as commonly used in logic programs. We also postulate two disjoint sets of variable symbols { object variables, and annotation variables.
De nition 1 An annotation is either an element of T , an annotation variable, or a complex annotation term. Annotation terms are de ned recursively as follows: members of T and variable annotations are annotation terms. In addition, if f 2 F n and x 1 ; . . .; x n are annotation terms, then f(x 1 ; . . .; x n ) is a complex annotation term. If A is a usual atomic formula of predicate calculus (built out of object variables and uninterpreted predicate, function, and constant symbols) and is an annotation, then A : is an annotated atom. An annotated atom containing no occurrences of object variables is ground. If This issue will be further discussed in Section 5.1. We also note that p(X) : p(s(X)) : 0:5
is not an annotated clause because it contains a complex annotation term in the clause-body.
De nition 3 Suppose C is an annotated clause. A c-annotated instance of C is any annotated clause obtained by replacing all annotation variables occurring in C by members of T . Di erent occurrences of the same annotation variable must be replaced by the same member of T . De nition 4 Suppose C is an annotated clause. A strictly ground instance of C is any ground instance of C which contains only c-annotations. Notice that since all functions in F are evaluable, annotation terms of the form f(a 1 ; :::; a n ), where a 1 , ..., a n 2 T and f 2 F n , are also considered to be ground and are identi ed with the result of the computation of f on the a i 's. We use the notation SGI(C) to denote the set of all strictly ground instances of a clause C. Similarly, if P is a GAP, then we denote the set of all strictly ground instances of clauses in P by SGI(P).
The General and Restricted Semantics
In this section, we propose two alternative model-theoretic semantics for GAPs. The rst corresponds closely to that in 31, 34] Note here the distinction between the two notions of interpretations. Restricted Herbrand interpretations assign a single truth value, i.e., essentially a principal ideal to ground atoms; in contrast, general interpretations assign arbitrary ideals to atoms. Therefore, every r-interpretation is also a general interpretation, but not vice versa. In the sequel, we will be freely switching between the two views of r-interpretations, i.e. we will think of them either as mappings B L 7 ! T or B L 7 ! PI(T ), depending on which of the views is more convenient at the moment. Following 32, 33], we could also de ne interpretations with arbitrary domains, but since in this paper we are mainly concerned with logic programming, we will restrict our attention to Herbrand interpretations only.
We assume that there is a unary operator : : T ! T , conceptually interpreted as negation. For the technical purposes of this paper, we do not need to impose any restrictions on :. However, sometimes one may wish : to satisfy certain epistemological criteria, such as : being a symmetric mapping, and the like. The proof theory for GAPs in Section 4 does not depend on these assumptions. The remaining cases (3) { (10) are de ned in exactly the same way as for general satisfaction.
As usual, an interpretation I (or r-interpretation J) is said to be a model (resp., r-model) of a formula F if and only if I j = F (resp., J j = r F). I is a model of a set of formulas P (of a GAP, in particular) if and only if it is a model of each of the formulas in P. Also, if P is a set of formulas and is a formula, we write P j = (or P j = r ) if and only if whenever I j = P (resp., I j = r P) then I j = (resp., I j = r ).
In annotated logics, there are at least two di erent (but related) notions of negation 32, 33] . The ontological negation is close to the standard negation in predicate calculus; for annotated logics it was rst studied in 32]. On the other hand, the negation de ned in (2) of De nition 7 is close to the negation used in multivalued logics. For annotated logics it was rst introduced in 43, 5, 7] ; it was dubbed epistemic negation in 32]. One of the advantages of epistemic negation is that, given a c-annotated literal :A : , there is a c-annotation = :( ) such that :A : is logically equivalent to A : . This type of negation is monotonic and, therefore, is more tractable. The other negation, ontological 32], de nes satisfaction of negated atoms as follows: I j = A : if and only if I 6 j = A : . In this case, there is usually no such that A : and A : are logically equivalent. As a result, ontological negation is computationally more expensive. However, the primary reason for our use of epistemic negation in this paper is not computational, but the fact that the negation in Fitting's theory of logic programming over 1 If t is an annotation ground term, it can be identi ed with a constant in T , since all annotation functions are evaluable.
bilattices 18] directly translates into the epistemic negation of GAPs (see Section 5.2). Also, it is easy to see that the implication, A B, can be expressed via ontological negation as follows: A_ B. However, \ " is not expressible via _,^, and the epistemic negation :. Therefore, since the ontological negation is not used in this paper, we had to de ne the implication \ " separately. Properties of ontological negation are discussed in detail in 32, 33, 13] .
The Thus, we can assume without loss of generality that, in every clause, variables occurring in the annotation of the clause head also appear as annotations of the body literals. We will make this assumption throughout this paper. For the facts (clauses with an empty body) appearing in GAPs, this implies that c-annotations can always be assumed, which is done till the end of the paper.
Following the usual development of the semantics of logic programs, we associate two operators T P and R P with any GAP P: T P maps interpretations to interpretations and R P maps r-interpretations to r-interpretations. Notice that if I is an r-interpretation (hence also an interpretation), then R P (I)(A) = tT P (I)(A) for each atom A, where t is the least upper bound operator (we postulate that tf g = ?). Later we will establish a much more general result regarding the relationship between T P and R P that will be subsequently used in Section 5 we may conclude in a nitary way that ? P (I)(A) should be closed under nite lubs. The main di erence between R P and T P is that R P would also allow in nite lubs to be present. It is precisely because of this nitary/in nitary distinction that T P possesses some desirable properties (to be discussed shortly) that R P does not possess. The question of which semantics is more intuitive depends on whether one believes that taking in nite lubs is a justi ed inference step. In any case, Theorem 3 below shows that for most practical purposes the two semantics yield the same results.
Theorem 1 Suppose P is a GAP, I is an interpretation and J is an r-interpretation. Then I is a model of P if and only if T P (I) I; J is an r-model of P if and only if R P (J) J; T P is monotonic; R P is monotonic.
Proof: A simple modi cation of the standard proof, e.g., from 35], with the use of the monotonicity property of annotated functions in F. 2
In what follows, we will often use a special \least" interpretation, , which assigns the empty ideal f g to every atom. In case of restricted interpretations, the least r-interpretation may not exist, unless we require T to have the least element ?. In the latter case, the least r-interpretation, denoted r , assigns ? to every atom in B L . Let us de ne the iterations of T P as follows: T P " 0 = . If is a successor ordinal, then T P " = T P (T P " ( ?1)); if is a limit ordinal, then T P " = t < T P " . In the preceding sentence, ( ?1) denotes the immediate predecessor of the successor ordinal . The iterations of R P are de ned similarly with the exception that R P " 0 = r . We will see that as in \classical" logic programming, T P is continuous, and the equation T P " ! = lfp(T P ) holds, but this is not always the case with R P .
Theorem 2 Let P be a GAP. Then 1. T P is continuous; 2. T P " ! = lfp(T P ) = the least model of P; 3. For all annotated ground atoms A : , P j = A : if and only if 2 T P " !(A).
Proof: The only non-obvious thing is the continuity of T P . The rest of the claims follow from continuity in a standard way.
To show continuity, let I 1 ; I 2 ; . . . be a directed sequence of interpretations of P (i.e., every nite subsequence I i 1 , ..., I i k has an upper bound I l : I l I i j , j = 1; :::; k). We have to show that T P (tI i ) = t(T P (I i )). It is easily seen from the de nitions that for any set of interpretations, fJ k g, their least upper bound, tJ k , is such an interpretation J that for every ground atom A, J(A) is the least ideal containing the set J i (A).
Since T P is monotonic, T P (I k ) T P (tI i ) for all k. Since, for every A, T P (tI i )(A) is an ideal, we conclude that T P (tI i ) t(T P (I i )).
In the other direction, let A be a ground atom such that 2 T P (tI i )(A). Then there must be a strict ground instance of a rule in P of the form A : f( 1 ; . . .; n ) B 1 : 1 & . . .&B n : n , where = f( 1 ; . . .; n ) and the literals B j : j are satis ed by tI i . This means that for every j = 1; :::; n, there are j1 , ..., jk j in T such that 1. each of the B j : jl is in some I i ; and 2. j = tf j1 ; :::; jk j g.
Since the set I i of interpretations is directed, there is some I i 0 that satis es all the B j : jl . Because of (1) Thus, because of Equation (1) and since T P (I i 0 ), being an ideal, is closed under nite least upper bounds, we derive that f( 1 ; . . .; n ) 2 t(T P (I i ))(A), which concludes the proof. 2 Corollary 1 If A is a ground atom such that 2 T P " !(A) then there is an integer n such that 2 T P " n(A). Proof: Since T P " n T P " (n + 1) for all n 0, it follows that (T P " !)(A) = (T P " n)(A) (i.e. a plain union of sets instead of the least upper bound t). Therefore must belong to one of the T P " n(A)'s. p : x q : 1 p : 1, where x is an annotation variable. It is easy to see that the interpretation T P " i, 0 i !, always assigns the empty ideal fg to q. Hence, (T P " !)(q) = fg. Now, according to the restricted semantics, (R P " !)(p) = faja 1g; (2) while according to the general semantics, (T P " !)(p) = faja < 1g:
Therefore, the r-semantics yields (R P (R P " !))(q) = T , because of the third rule, while by the general semantics we have (T P (T P " !))(q) = f g. This shows that R P " ! is not a xpoint of R P in the r-semantics; however, in the general semantics, T P " ! is a xpoint of T P , by Theorem 2. Notice that the only di erence between Equations (2) and (3) is that \ " is used in (2), while in (3) \<" is employed.
2 Thus, we see that one of the major di erences between R P and T P is that the latter is continuous and hence attains a xed-point at the !-th step of its upward iteration, while R P does not possess either of these properties. Interestingly, this profound di erence is merely due to the fact that we used di erent notions of least upper bound (of in nite sets of annotations) to de ne T P and R P . In the remainder of this section we give a simple characterization of when R P attains a xed-point at !. Blair and Subrahmanian 5, 7] have shown that lfp(R P ) = R P " ! whenever P is cannotated, and T is a lattice. It follows immediately from that proof that the same result holds when no annotation variables appear in rule bodies. In parallel, Kifer and Li 31] showed that lfp(R P ) = R P " ! holds at the other end of the spectrum: when P contains only vannotations in rule bodies (in which case R P is even continuous). This implies that R P exhibits undesirable behaviour only when c-and v-annotations are intermixed in rule bodies.
Apart from the two important cases considered in 5, 7, 31], there is a large class of programs for which R P is not necessarily continuous, but still R P " ! = lfp(R P ) holds. Let us call the latter equation the xpoint reachability requirement. Reachability of the least xed point in at most ! iterations is important for a practical logic programming system, since otherwise it may often mean that no proof theory for the respective class of programs is likely to exist. In the following we identify a large class of programs for which the xpoint reachability property of R P holds.
First we need to introduce one additional operator, denoted`, that maps general interpretations to r-interpretations. Given an interpretation, J, we de ne (`J)(A) = tf j 2 J(A)g, for every atom A of B L . Here t is the operator that yields the unique least upper bound of a set (assuming that tf g = ?). This operator will be used to establish a relationship between R P and T P . Its usefulness in this context becomes apparent if we recall that R P (I)(A) = tT P (I)(A) { a property that immediately follows from the de nition.
De nition 11 A program P is acceptable if and only if the following property holds for every c-annotated literal l in the body of P:
If`(T P " !) j = l 0 for some ground instance l 0 of l, then T P " ! j = l 0 . 2
It is easily seen that all programs whose clause bodies are either entirely c-annotated or all are v-annotated, are acceptable. In the rst case, this is because (T P " !) (A) is a nitely generated ideal for every atom A, and all such ideals are obviously principal. Hence`(T P " !) = T P " !.
In the second case, the acceptability follows because the condition in De nition 11 is vacuously satis ed (as there are no c-annotations in the body of P).
Example 4 Consider again the program P of Example 3. Here (T P " !)(p) = faja < 1g and thus (T P " !) 6 j = p : 1. On the other hand,`(T P " !)(p) = faja 1g and hencè (T P " !) j = p : 1. Since p : 1 is a c-annotated literal in the body of P, P is not acceptable. 2 Theorem 3 If P is acceptable and T has a least element ? then R P " ! = lfp(R P ) = the least r-model of P =`(lfp(T P )).
Surprisingly, this theorem hinges on the assumption about ? as much as it does on the assumption about acceptability of P. To see this, consider a semilattice without ?, e.g., T = ft; f; >g. Assume that t, f are incomparable to each other, but both are smaller than >. Then the program fp : X q : Xg has two minimal models: fp : t; q : tg and fp : f; q : fg, none of which is the least r-model. We thus assume the existence of ? till the end of this section. Likewise, we require T to be a complete semilattice in order for R P to be well-de ned.
Proof of Theorem 3: By (1) of Lemma 1 below and by (1) of Theorem 2, it follows that R P " ! =`(lfp(T P )). By (2) of Lemma 1, R P " ! is a xpoint of R P ; it is the least such xpoint because of the monotonicity of R P (Theorem 1). The claim about the least r-model being equal to all the rest, also easily follows from Theorem 1.
2 Lemma 1 Let P be an acceptable GAP and T be a complete upper semilattice with the least element ?. Then 1. R P " ! =`(T P " ! ).
2. R P (R P " !) = R P " !.
Proof: For Claim (1), we will show that R P " ! `( T P " ! ) and vice versa.
To see that R P " ! t(T P " ! ) we rst prove by induction that R P " i T P " i, for all i.
The base case is immediate:
T P " 0 = r = R P " 0:
For the inductive case,
In Equation (4), the rst inclusion follows because T P (I)(A) R P (I)(A) for all atoms A and the second one follows by the inductive assumption and because of the monotonicity of R P . We now obtain that for all k, T P " k(A) R P " !(A) and, nally, that R P " !(A) t(T P " ! )(A).
In the other direction, we show that for all i,
It would then follow that for every A, t(T P " !)(A) tf(R P " i)(A)ji = 1; 2; . . .g = R P " !:
We prove (5) by induction on i. The base case is trivial, since r = t , by de nition. For the inductive step, assume that t(T P " !)(A) (R P " k)(A) for all A; we will show that this equality holds for k + 1 as well.
By the de nition of R P , R P (R P " k)(A) = tff( 1 ; ensure that logical implication holds also in cases when some of the i are annotation constants appearing in the body of P). Now, since annotation functions are continuous, tff( j 1 ; . . .; j n ) j j = 1; 2; . . .g = f( 1 ; . . .; n ). Therefore R P (R P " k)(A) t(T P " !)(A).
For Claim (2), R P (R P " !) R P " ! follows from the monotonicity of R P and since R P " ! R P " i, for all i. The other inclusion is proved similarly to the earlier proof that R P (R P " k)(A) t(T P " !)(A), in Claim (1). 2 4 Constrained Queries and GAPs 
In the above, if is not required to be a most general uni er (i.e. is allowed to be any uni er), then Q 0 is called an unrestricted resolvent of C and Q with respect to A i . 2
A constraint C is solvable with respect to the semilattice T and the set F of interpreted annotation functions if and only if there is an assignment of elements in T to the annotation variables of C, such that C has a solution with respect to T and F (C is evaluated using the intended interpretation of the annotation functions in F).
There is an important class of constraints, called normal constraints, which we de ne next. Lemma 2 Suppose T is a lattice (not necessarily complete). Then 1. If C and Q are a normal clause and a normal query, respectively, then the resolvent of Q and C is a normal query.
2. Satis ability of any normal constraint is decidable.
Proof: (1) Notice that i in Equation (6) x. Clearly, the resulting constraint will still be normal and equivalent to C. Repeating this process, we will achieve the desired grouping of conjuncts in C.
The test for satis ability of C in T now follows:
a. If C is an empty constraint, return (satis able). b. Let i 0 1 be the maximal integer such that i 0 is the same symbol as 1 . Substitute > for each of the variables occurring in 1 , ..., i 0 (the substitution must be done throughout C). Since C is normal, none of these variables appears on the right-hand side of C. Let the resulting constraint and annotation terms be also denoted by C and i 's, respectively. Notice that now each of the 1 , ..., i 0 can be evaluated to an element of T . Correctness of this algorithm follows immediately from the fact that all functions used in the j in C are monotonic (see assumptions at the beginning of Section 2). Termination of the algorithm follows from the assumption that all functions in F are computable.
2.
It is easy to see that the above result can be strengthened somewhat by replacing the requirement that T must be a lattice by a weaker requirement that every nite subset of T has a (not necessarily greatest) lower bound. However, then we will have to restrict C to be not only a normal constraint but also such that all conjuncts i i , where i is a constant, appear in front of C. Indeed, it is easy to verify that T needs be a lattice only in step (d) of Lemma 2 and that this step will go through under the modi ed requirements. The next result says that if T is nite then the requirement of normality can be dropped altogether. Lemma 3 For nite semilattices T , satis ability of every constraint is decidable.
Proof: Suppose C is a constraint over T . Let GRD be the set of all instances of this constraint obtained by (uniformly) replacing all occurrences of annotation variables by annotation constants (in particular, constraints in GRD are free of annotation variables). As T is nite, GRD is a nite set of ground constraints (since constraints contain no quanti ers, by de nition). Now, C is solvable if and only if some constraint in GRD is solvable. But for ground constraints satisfaction is obviously decidable since they are conjunctions of ground atoms involving decidable predicates only.
2
Of course, the algorithm of Lemma 3 is impractical and we just used it as a decidability argument; e cient algorithms for constraint solving over T are presented in 22].
De nition 16 A deduction of a constrained query Q 0 from a GAP P is a sequence: Q 0 ; hC 0 ; 0 i; Q 1 ; . . .; Q n ; hC n ; n i; Q n+1 such that:
1. Q i+1 is a resolvent of Q i and C i via mgu i ; and 2. C i is a reductant of P that contains no variables in common with Q i .
When the i 's in the above deduction are required to be uni ers but not necessarily mgu's (i.e.
the Q i 's, i 1, are only required to be unrestricted resolvents), then the above deduction is called an unrestricted deduction.
De nition 17 The deduction < = Q 0 ; hC 0 ; 0 i; Q 1 ; . . .; Q n ; hC n ; n i; Q n+1 of the query Q 0 from P is a refutation if and only if 1. Q n+1 , the resolvent of Q n and C n , has an empty query-part (i.e., Q n+1 is just a constraint); and 2. Q n+1 is solvable with respect to the lattice T and the set of annotation functions F.
In what follows, we will use SOL(<) to denote the set of solutions of the constraint-part of Q n+1 .
Unrestricted refutation is de ned similarly (where \deduction" must be replaced by \unrestricted deduction"). The implementation of the above refutation procedure hinges upon two things:
The ability to solve lattice constraints; and The ability to restrict the choice of reductants.
Studying the ways of solving constraints is beyond the scope of this paper; 22] deals with e cient serial and parallel algorithms for this task. The need to use reductants of P rather then just the clauses of P is another major obstacle. Indeed, the main appeal of SLD-resolution is that the choice of clauses that need to be considered is restricted to the current goal and the program clauses. However, if reductants are to be used, one may generate an in nite number of them out of a nite set of program clauses. Therefore, for GAPs, SLD-resolution with reduction is no better than the general resolution. Fortunately, for a large class of semilattices, we can e ectively limit the number of reductants to be considered in refutations.
De nition 18 An upper semilattice T is n-wide if for every nite 4 set E 2 T , there is a nite subset E 0 E of at most n elements such that tE 0 = tE. A n-reductant of a program P is a reductant involving no more than n clauses of P.
Many popular semilattices have nite width. Clearly, all nite semilattices are of this kind.
Among the in nite ones, the semilattice of the form 0; 1] n has width n (here (a 1 ; :::; a n ) t (b 1 ; :::; b n ) = (a 1 t b 1 ; :::; a n t b n )). In particular, 0; 1] and 0; 1] 2 are frequently used in expert systems. To show that, e.g., 0; 1] 2 is 2-wide, let 1 = a 1 ; b 1 ] , ..., k = a k ; b k ] be a nite set of pairs of real numbers in the interval 0; 1]. Let a i (resp., b j ) be the maximal element among the a 1 , ..., a k (resp., b 1 , ..., b k ). Then, i t j = tf 1 ; :::; k g, which proves that 0; 1] 2 is 2-wide.
As we shall see, if T is n-wide, then in building refutations it su ces to consider n-reductants only. This limits the choice of clauses to resolve with to a nite set of n-reductants.
Theorem 5 (Soundness) Suppose P is a GAP and Q is a constrained query such that Q 0 ; hC 0 ; 0 i; Q 1 ; . . .; Q n ; hC n ; n i; Q n+1 is a refutation of Q 0 from the GAP P. Let be any solution for the constraint-part of Q n+1 . Then Q 0 is an annotation-variable-free query obtained by replacing all annotation variables in Q 0 by the annotation constants speci ed in . We claim that: P j = (8)(Q 0 ) 0 1 n (recall that (8)Q 0 denotes a conjunction of body literals of query Q 0 , universally quanti ed).
Proof: We proceed by induction on n, the length of the refutation of Q 0 from P. Lemma 4 (Mgu Lemma) Suppose P is a GAP and Q is a query. Suppose there is an unrestricted refutation < of Q such that 2 SOL(<) (SOL was de ned in De nition 17). Then there is a refutation < 0 of Q such that 2 SOL(< 0 ). Proof: Similar to the proof of the mgu lemma in classical logic programming (Lloyd, 35] ). 2 Lemma 5 (Lifting Lemma) Suppose P is a GAP and Q is a normal query. Suppose is an assignment of c-annotations to some (not necessarily all) annotation variables in Q and let be a substitution for object variables. If there is a refutation < of Q from P, then there is a refutation < 0 of Q from P. Proof: Similar to the proof of the classical lifting lemma (cf. Lloyd 35] is the constraint-part of Q. As P j = (9)Q, it follows from Theorem 2 that T P " ! j = (9)Q and hence, there is an integer n such that T P " n j = (9)Q. We rst proceed by induction on n to show that there is an unrestricted refutation of Q from P. Base Case: m = 1. In this case, k = 1 and there is a reductant C of P of the form:
A 1 : such that the constraint C 1 (C Q & 1 ) is solvable. Hence, Q; hC; i; Q 1 , where Q 1 is the goal ? ? C 1 , is an unrestricted refutation of Q from P. Inductive
Step: m = n + 1. Suppose now that T P " (n + 1) j = (9)Q. In particular, there is a variable-free instance Q of Q (here, is an assignment of c-annotations to annotation variables and is a ground substitution for object variables) such that T P " (n + 1) j = Q . By the de nition of T P (De nition 9), this implies that for each 1 i k, there is a reductant of P, denoted C i , having a ground instance of the form is an unrestricted refutation of Q from P. By the Lifting Lemma, there is an unrestricted refutation of Q from P. This completes the proof of the inductive step. Thus, we know that there is an unrestricted refutation of Q from P. By the Mgu Lemma, it now follows that there is a refutation of Q from P. 2
It should be noted that there is no similar completeness result for r-entailment, even in the case of acceptable GAPs.
Example 7 Consider the following program P:
The query ? ? p : 1 cannot be refuted by the above proof procedure, even though P j = r p : 1. Notice that P 6 j = p : 1 and so this argument is applicable to the restricted semantics but not to the general one.
In fact, Example 7 shows that Herbrand's theorem does not hold for r-entailment even for acceptable GAPs, which indicates that there is no su ciently general proof procedure for the restricted semantics.
We see that there is a close relationship between annotated logic programming and constraint logic programming 30]. As will be shown later, there is also a close connection between annotated programs and certain fragments of temporal logics. Thus, there is hope that in the future a single unifying framework for multivalued, temporal, and constraint logic programming will emerge.
In related works, Morishita 36] and Subrahmanian 44] have also studied multivalued logic programming where annotations were associated with clauses, rather than with individual atoms. Morishita's framework is as follows: Associated with each atom is a lattice, and associated with each clause is a function that maps the product of the lattices associated with the atoms in the body of the clause to the lattice associated with the head. Soundness of the proof procedure is established for queries that have a nite AND/OR tree associated with them (cf. 36, Theorem 4.11]). This restriction is not needed in our work. It must also be pointed out that our idealtheoretic semantics di ers from Morishita's semantics. Hence our completeness result applies to Example 7, whereas Morishita's completeness result is inapplicable to that example. Results on query processing procedures for programs whose clauses are c-annotated were obtained in Subrahmanian 44] and Kifer and Lozinskii 32, 33].
Multivalued Logics and GAPs
The principal aim of this section is to show that quantitative logic programming as proposed by van Emden 47] and also the bilattice-based logic programs of Fitting 18] , all t into the framework of GAPs. Associated with a QRS, P, is an operator S P that maps interpretations to interpretations, and is de ned as follows:
van Emden's Quantitative Deduction
S P (I)(A) = tfr k j r : A B 1 & . . .& B n is a ground instance of a clause in P and minfI(B 1 ); . . .; I(B n )g = kg.
If P is a QRS, then it can be translated into a GAP, tr(P), as follows:
tr ( Note that according to this translation, all QRSs get translated into GAPs whose bodies contain only v-annotated literals. Hence, for any QRS P, tr(P) is an acceptable GAP and thus R tr (P ) has the xpoint reachability property.
Theorem 7 Suppose P is a QRS. Then S P = R tr(P ) . Proof: The proof is a direct consequence of the de nition of tr(P).
2 Theorem 7 shows, in particular, that lfp(S P ) = lfp(R tr(P ) ), and since tr(P) is always acceptable, we also have that lfp(S P ) =`lfp(T tr(P ) ).
Furthermore, for nite programs (i.e. programs with a nite set of rules and facts) we can
show that`lfp(T tr(P ) ) = lfp(T tr(P ) ). Indeed, because of the special form of their annotation functions, the rules in tr(P) never produce new annotation constants when applied in the computation of T tr(P ) " !. Therefore, for any atom A, (T tr(P ) " !)(A) will be a nitely generated ideal. Since every such ideal is principal, the`operator has no e ect on lfp(T tr(P ) ).
Furthermore, note that the clauses in tr(P) have empty constraint-parts and thus are normal.
As a consequence of the fact that lfp(S P ) = lfp(T tr(P ) ), one can study the least model of a QRS P by studying the least model of the GAP tr(P), and the remark about normality of tr(P) in the previous paragraph implies that the proof procedure for GAPs described in the preceding section yields a sound and complete proof procedure for answering existential queries to QRS. This improves upon van Emden's \weak soundness and completeness" results in two ways:
1. van Emden's evaluation procedure 47] works under the conditions that the AND/OR tree associated with a program P and a query Q is nite. No such restriction is needed here.
2. van Emden's proof procedure applies to ground queries. The procedure for GAPs described in this paper applies to non-ground existential queries as well.
Thus, the theorems about GAPs given in the previous section shed new light on the operational aspects of van Emden's QRSs. However, unlike QRSs, GAPs are not restricted to the interval 0,1] of truth values, and the results are applicable to any multi-valued logic based on a complete lattice that possesses Henkin's existential property.
Bilattice-valued Logics
For the purpose of this section, we assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of Fitting's theory of bilattice-based logic programming developed in 18]. Bilattices, due to Ginsberg 23] , provide an elegant epistemological framework for studying multivalued logics. Intuitively, a bilattice (also known as an interlaced bilattice) is a set < having two orderings: the knowledge order, k , and the truth order, t , such that (<; k ; u k ; t k ) and (<; t ; u t ; t t ) are both complete lattices. In addition, meets and joins with respect to k are monotone with respect to t and vice versa. Fitting 17, 18] has developed a theory of xpoints for logic programs whose associated set of truth values forms a bilattice.
In Fitting's formulation, the syntax of a bilattice logic program is similar to that of an ordinary logic program, except that the body of a clause may be an arbitrary rst order formula constructed out of^t, _ t (\and" and \or" with respect to t ),^k, _ k (\and" and \or" relative to k ), and :. Negation is interpreted as a unary function on truth values such that 1 k 2 if and only if : 1 k : 2 , and 1 t 2 if and only if : 2 t : 1 .
Unlike annotated clauses that essentially have a two-valued satisfaction relation, in bilatticebased logics formulae may assume any truth value from <. The fundamental role of the truth order is to allow de ning the logical connectives^t, _ t , and : without having to bother with speci cs of the set of truth values <. In contrast, the truth order plays no role in the semantics of annotated logics. The fundamental role of the knowledge order is to give meaning to logical implication, and it is used in a similar way by both annotated and bilattice-based logics. In a sense, the results of this section show that Fitting's theory of bilattice-based logic programming uses the knowledge order in a more essential way than the truth order.
Interpretations of Fitting's programs are the same as r-interpretations of GAPs. In other words, they are functions from Herbrand base of P to <. These functions are extended to arbitrary formulas by distributing them through the connectives^t, _ t ,^k, _ t , and :. Associated with a program, P, is an operator V P that maps interpretations to interpretations as follows: In the above, _ and^are logical connectives, while t and u are meet and join on < relative to the appropriate orderings ( t or k ). Furthermore, for the purpose of this translation, we assume that the GAP bl(P) uses the same negation operator : : < ?! < as the one used by the bilattice-based program P.
Note that according to this translation, if P is a bilattice program, then bl(P) is a GAP such that all literals occurring in clause bodies are v-annotated. Hence, bl(P) is acceptable.
As mentioned earlier, the truth-order plays no role in the semantics of GAPs, while it does in the semantics of multivalued programs. However, as can be seen from the de nition of bl(C), the truth-order of bilattices is encoded in the annotation functions of clauses of bl(C). This explains why GAPs can successfully simulate multivalued programs.
Theorem 8 Suppose P is a bilattice-based logic program. Then V P = R bl(P ) . Proof: The proof is a straightforward consequence of the translation of P into a GAP. It is clear that the annotation functions in the GAP bl(P) have been designed precisely so that they would simulate the computation of truth values for the rule heads in the bilattice-based program P.
2
Since rule bodies in bl(P) are v-annotated, such programs are acceptable and we have lfp(V P ) =`lfp(T bl(P ) ). In general, this equality does not guarantee the existence of a complete proof theory for bilattice-based logic programs. However, for distributive bilattices such a proof procedure does exist. A distributive bilattice 18] is a bilattice satisfying all twelve distributive laws for various combinations of the operators t k , t t , u k , and u t . Now, as in the case of van Emden's QRSs, nite programs will result in only a nite number of annotations being mentioned in bl(P). Since in a distributive bilattice one can always convert any expression involving t k , t t , u k , and u t into a normal form (e.g., a disjunctive normal form with k-operators inside and t-operators outside), such expressions can yield only a nite number of annotation constants, given a nite number of such constants as an input. Therefore, arguing as in the previous subsection, we conclude that`has no e ect on lfp(T bl(P ) ), i.e. lfp(V P ) = lfp(T bl(P ) ). Furthermore, as with QRS, we can observe that constraints arising in bl(P) are normal and therefore the proof procedure developed for GAPs applies.
As a consequence, once again, just as in the case of van Emden's QRSs 47], we can study the semantics of bilattice logic programming by studying the semantics of the corresponding GAPs, and we can use the corresponding proof procedure to answer queries. There are several advantages in doing so: As a consequence of the last two theorems, the models of a bilattice logic program P are also the models of the GAP bl(P), and their least models coincide. Thus, bilattice model theory can be studied through the model theory of GAPs. Moreover, in the case of nite databases and distributive bilattices, processing of existential queries to bilattice logic programs can be converted into the equivalent problem of processing existential queries for GAPs. There is at least one intriguing result due to Fitting that does not t in our framework. This is the elegant theorem that states the connection between the least xed-point of V P relative to the k ordering, and the greatest xed-point of the V P operator in the t ordering. This result cannot be obtained in the GAP framework simply because our formalization assumes only one ordering on T , namely k .
Temporal Reasoning
There are several di erent kinds of temporal logics. One of the fundamental di erences of opinion between temporal logicians concerns the issue of the nature of time. Various representations of time are possible { each representation is accompanied by a host of philosophical and epistemological arguments. Here, we will consider two widely accepted representations: The above clause C can be translated into the following c-annotated clause an(C):
A 0 : fi 0 g A 1 : fi 1 g& . . .&A n : fi n g : For a temporal program, P, an(P) = fan(C)j C 2 Pg.
To compare GAPs with 3], let Y be the set of all non-negative integers f0; 1; . . .g, and T = P(Y) be the lattice of all sets of non-negative integers ordered by inclusion, which we call the temporal lattice. Thus, for instance, Baudinet's interpretation f Ag that says that A is true at time 2 and all other propositions are false at all times is captured by our multivalued interpretation I de ned as: I(A) = f2g and for all B 6 = A; I(B) = f g Formally, let I be a collection of Baudinet's next-atoms. The translation of I into an rinterpretation, an(I), for annotated logic is:
(an(I))(A) = fi j i A 2 Ig. Theorem 10 For any temporal program, P, and a Baudinet's interpretation, I, an(Z P (I)) = R an(P ) (an(I)).
2
The above theorem establishes that one way of studying Baudinet's temporal logic programming is within the framework of GAPs. For instance, as in Section 5, we can argue that for nite programs R an(P ) = T an(P ) and this allows us to use the theorems in Section 4 to de ne a proof procedure for answering existential queries to temporal programs.
A more expressive temporal logic was proposed by Abadi 2(rich(X) president(X)):
The statement: \if sometime she becomes a president then she must be rich" is written as 2(rich(X) 3president(X))
in TEMPLOG, and as rich(X) : f0g president(X) :
in our logic.
On the other hand, the statement \if X is a life-long president, then X is a ruthless murderer", written as 2(murderer(X) 2president(X)) in temporal logic, is not allowed in TEMPLOG. In contrast, representing this as a GAP is straightforward:
murderer(X) : > president(X) : >:
In general, since we allow arbitrary computable functions (subject to the restrictions of Section 4) in rule heads while both Baudinet and Abadi and Manna restrict the rule heads to be next-atoms (i.e. c-annotated literals, in our setting), GAPs can express several fancy temporal problems that are beyond the scope of 1, 3] . Also, we do not restrict bodies of temporal programs to be 2-free, since atoms of the form A : > are perfectly acceptable.
There are, however, situations where GAPs are weaker than 1]. For instance, GAPs cannot express a clause with the following body: 3(p^3q). Likewise, we cannot represent directly the initial clauses of Abadi and Manna, since GAP rules are permanently true. This di culty could be overcome by using metaprogramming techniques (e.g. 45]). In these formalisms, formulae can be encoded by terms, and thus can be reasoned about. For instance, if < B A > is an encoding of a clause B A, then we could write clause(< B A >) : f0g, stating that the respective clause is true at time 0, which corresponds to the initial clause B A of 1]. We will not discuss this issue any further in this paper. More information about encodings and logics for meta-reasoning can be found in 14, 37, 38, 27, 45].
Multivalued Temporal Reasoning
One advantage of the GAP formalism as opposed to Baudinet's and Abadi and Manna's is that it also allows one to deal with \epistemically inconsistent worlds", i.e. interpretations in which at certain times t the information about certain ground atoms is inconsistent. More generally, assume that now our domain of truth values is the set of functions from Y to some complete lattice T 0 , i.e. T = (Y ! T 0 ): For instance, we can take T 0 to be the four-valued Belnap's lattice 4] shown in Figure 1 , or we can take T 0 to be the set 0; 1] 0; 1] often used for modeling uncertainty in expert systems 7, 31, 18 ]. An interpretation is a map from B L to T . The underlying intuition is that an interpretation I assigns to any ground atom A, a function f A from Y to T 0 . If T 0 is the fourvalued Belnap's lattice of Figure 1 , and f A (3) = >, f A (4) = t then we can think of this as an assertion that at time 3, A was inconsistently de ned, but at time 4 it became true.
Interval Based Temporal Logic
Let us assume that time is linearly represented by the set of all non-negative integers. In an interval based temporal logic, we can use closed intervals of integers as truth values. We use the notation: a; b] = fn j a n bg: Let < be the set < = f a; b] j a b and a; b are non-negative integersg:
The intervals in < are partially ordered by inclusion and we denote this ordering by < . Let us take T to be the set of subsets of < such that every 2 T satis es the following two properties: Also note that satis ability of constraints in the above clauses is decidable since this is a very simple case of linear programming, and thus the proof theory for GAPs applies.
The above translation precisely captures the intended meaning of the modal operators of Shoham 42] but, in general, we cannot simulate full-edged interval-based temporal logics. This, of course, does not come as a surprise, since even the propositional temporal logic ITL has an undecidable validity problem 25].
Conclusions
There are many alternative formalisms for multivalued and temporal logic programming. However, the relationship between these di erent formalisms is not well understood. In this paper, we have made a rst contribution towards the understanding of di erent methodologies for logic programming based on non-standard logics.
We have shown that annotated logics can serve as common grounds for several of the multivalued and temporal formalisms. Besides the theoretical interest, this has numerous practical bene ts. First, already known results about GAPs can be used to obtain a direct characterization of certain kinds of temporal reasoning. Second, GAPs can be used to identify semi-decidable fragments of temporal logics by translating them into GAPs, as suggested in this paper (recall that the implication problem for GAPs is recursively enumerable). This is important because, we believe, logics with non-recursively enumerable implication problem cannot be e ectively implemented on a computer. Third, it gives a proof theory to formalisms based on multivalued logics, such as 47, 18] , which can be naturally translated into GAPs. Finally, when all else fails, one may prefer to program in terms of GAPs directly rather than using di erent formalisms (subsumed by GAPs) for di erent purposes.
